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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
Ac1rnow.r.1'DGYtN'.l.'.-UND!lR A S'.l.'ATU'.l.'E REGuI.A'.l.'ING AcKNOWI.EDGMltN'.1.'S BY 
MARRIJ;;D WoMr:N-AN ExAMINA'.l.'ION MADt OVllR TuU:PHONt xs NO'.!.' Sui:.111-
CIEN'.l.'.-In a question involving the validity of a mortgage deed, it appeared 
that the acknowledgment of a Mrs. Bertholf had been taken by mean& of tele-
phone. The court, in construing the Idaho statute regulating acknowledg-
ments of married women, held that the clear intent of the statute was that 
all acknowledgments should be taken !n person before the magistrate, and 
any attempted acknowledgment not taken in person, though correct in form 
and without suspicion of fraud, was void, being beyond the power of the 
officer. Myers v. Eby (Idaho, 1920), 193 Pac. 77. 
That so common a meth~ of taking acknowledgments should be found 
void is perhaps startling, yet seems in entire accord with the great weight of 
authority. Privy examinations . of married women taken by telephone have 
generally been held invalid. Roach v. Francisco, 138 Tenn. 357, 197 S. W. 
1099, refuses to allow such a practice upon the general basis that their statute 
had not been passed at the time of the inauguration of telephones, and 
acknowledgments by such means could not have been within the purview of 
the legislature? Wester v. Hurt,-·-· Tenn.--, 130 S. W. 1099, decides 
against suclt a practice on the ground that judicial determination has decided 
that such examinations must be personal. The chief authority for a differ-
ent view is Banning v. Banning, 8o Cal. 2j'I, 13 Am. St. Rep. 156, where the 
court states the unmistakable view that an acknowledgment made by tele-
phone may be valid and the facts in it may not be impeached so long as 
there are no errors in form and no evidence of fraud is produced. Tbe 
statute in ·that case and that in the principal case are similar, and there is 
no more basis for regarding the necessity for personal appearance greater 
in one case than in the other because of the mere wording of the statutes. 
Although in Banning v. Banning the wife is attempting to avoid the deed 
on the ground that acknowledgment was made over the telephone, the court 
does not put its decision upon the basis of estoppel, but takes the stand that 
such an acknowledgment is sufficient to satisfy the statute. While such a 
practice might prove expeditious and is already much used, the dangers of 
such a course appe'ar in S1111ivan v. First Nat. Bank, 37 Te.~. Civ. App. 228, 
where the court says that the safeguards given in the requirement of acknowl-
edgment lie in the fact that the officer knows the person making the oath 
and stating the deed to be his own. If the officer is forced to receive the 
acknowledgment by telephone, in very few cases he is in a position to 
identify the speaker and must accept the statement of the speaker as to his 
identity. Thus, when the question later arises as to whether the one whose 
name was used in the deed made the aknowledgment, there is no means of 
determining whether the identity of the one whose name was used in the 
acknowledgment is the same as the one using the telephone to secure the 
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acknowledgment. The court in the principal case seems justified in con-
struing the statute so as to secure better mean"s of obtaining satisfactory 
evidence that the one making the acknowledgment is the same person 
described in the instrument. 
AuTOMOBII;i>s-CoNTRIBUTORY N£GLIGI;NCS oF TH:£ Gui>sT IN FAILING To 
w ARN THE DIUVtR OF 1MP:£NDING DANG:£R.-The plaintiff was riding as a guest 
in the defendant's automobile. The windshield of the car was frosted so that 
neither was able to see that a crossing was blocked by a standing train until 
too late to avoid collision. The plaintiff ·had warned the defendant of the 
excessive speed' at which he was driving, but testified that he did not know 
whether or not the defendant had heard his protest. The plaintiff knew the 
position of the railroad crossing, but did not remonstrate with the defendant 
in regard to the manner in which he was approaching it. Held, that the -
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Failure· 
on the part of the guest to see that the driver is keeping a proper lookout 
or to protest the negligent manner in which the car is being driven will bar 
a recovery from the driver in case of injury. Howe v. Corey (Wis., 1920), 
I79 N. W. 79I. 
The driver of an automobile owes a duty to his invited guest to e.'Cercise 
ordinary care not to increase the danger ordinarily incid'ent to driving; and 
if he fails to exercise such duty he is liable for the injury proximately 
resulting. Perkins v. Gallowas, Ig8 Ala. 658, affirming I94 Ala. ,265; Beard 
v. Klusmeier, I58 Ky. 153- And it seems that the guest, likewise, owes a 
duty to use reasonable care for his own safety. Pe11n. Ry. v. Henderson, 
I79 Fed. 577. But what does this duty require of the guest? The Indiana 
court has held that it is not necessary for him to jump out of the car. Union 
Traction Co. v. Love, 18o Ind. 442. Nor is he required to ask permission to 
get out. Tim1ey v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, I55 Mo. App. 5I3. And 
the Rhode Island court does not even require the guest to protest when the 
car is being driven at an excessive speed. Herman v. Rhode Island Co., ;36 
R. I. 447. However, the principal case would seem to place .a burden. upon 
the guest not only of protesting an excessive rate of speed but also cf con-
tinuing to protest until he is certain that his complaints have come to the 
knowledge of the driver. Furthermore, he must remonstrate with the driver 
in regard to the manner in which each new situation of danger is approached 
in order not to assume the risk of possible resulting injury. It appears to 
the writer that such a rule is quite contrary to the dictates of sound reason 
and common experience. It, in effect, places a burden upon the guest of 
electing between becoming a "back seat driver" or his own insurer against 
all the perils encountered during the drive. 
CARRI£RS-LIA1lILI'l'Y FOR Los'!' BAGGAG£-PASSENG:£R FROM ADJACENT FOR-
EIGN CouNTRY.-The plaintiff was on a journey from Canada to El Paso, 
Texas, traveling on a coupon ticket to El Paso and return, with a stop-over 
privilege of which she availed herself at San Antonio. She checked her 
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trunk from there to El Paso, on which trip it was lost. When she purchased 
her ticket at Timmins, Ontario, she was not told of any limitation of the 
car·rier's liability, and it does not appear that any notice appeared on the 
ticket. The company claims that she was on an interstate journey, and that 
since it had duly filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and pub-
lished a tariff limiting liability to $100 unless passenger declared a higher 
value and paid excess charges, it is liable only for that amount. The plaintiff 
sued in a Texas court for the full value, which was $soo. The Texas Court 
of Appeals allowed full recovery. Held, that she is entitled only to $100. 
Galveston,, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railwa.~ Co. v. Woodbury (U. S. 
Supreme Court, Dec. 13, 1920). 
For history of the development of the right of a carrier to limit liability, 
see Law Review articles cited in 17 MICH. L. Ri;;v. 183. The Act to Regulate 
Commerce applies to "passengers and property" expressly in three situations : 
where the passenger is traveling from one state to another, where he is trav-
eling f.rom a point in the United States to another point in: the United States 
through a foreign country, and where he is traveling from a point in the 
United States to an adjacent foreign country. Before the Clirmack Amend~ 
ment was passed it had been held that a commoll: carrier could contract to 
exempt himself from all liability except for losses caused by his own negli-
gence. R. Cq. v. Lockwood, 17 WalL 357. And an agreement as to valuation 
of property is valid, and carrier's liability is restricted to that value, not by 
virtue of a contract, but by estoppel. Hart v. Penn. Rd., u2 U. S. 331. It 
was held in Matter of Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. R 550, that the Hepburn 
Act with the Carmack Amendment made carriers liable for losses caused 
by them, thus stipulating that the carrier could not stipulate to exempt him-
self from liability for losses due to his OWill negligence; and that although 
he could limit recovery to an honestly agreed valuation, even where the loss 
was due to his own negligence, Hart v. Penn. Rd., supra, yet where the val-
uation was only an arbitrary attempt to limit recovery to a specified amount, 
regardless of value,. "the law will not countenance so obvious a subterfuge.'· 
The Act superseded all state legislation on the subject, leaving the shipper 
only the rights he had had under existing Federal laws. Adams E.~press Co. 
v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491. Attempts to limit liability for losses due to neg-
ligence are void (Boston & Maine Rd. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439), but the utmost 
freedom in limiting liability to an agreed valuation has been allowed, holding · 
the shipper to the agreed valuation, where both shipper and carrier know 
that it bears no relation to the real value, even though loss is due to carrier's 
negligence. Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 236 U. S. 278. 'fhe Carmack 
Amendment applies to baggage. Boston & Maine R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 
97. The Cummins Amendntent, 38 S'l'A'l'. ng6, passed shortly after the Pierce 
case, supra, was decided, applied to baggage, but as amended, 39 S'l'A'l'. 441, 
it does not, as is said in the principal case, Culbreth v. Martin, 103 S. E. 374 
Justice Brand'ei.s, in his opinion in the principal case, follows Boston & Maine 
R. v. Hooker, supra, which holds that although the passenger did not know 
of the limitation of liability in the tariffs of the carrier filed with the Inter-
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state Commerce Commission, yet if such stipttlation in the tariffs limits lia-
bility for loss of baggage to $roo if no other valuation· is declared, and the 
regulations are observed, and the passenger makes no declaration, he cannot 
recover more than the $100. However, the dissenting opinion by Justice 
Pitney, in: which he says that the formula of rates filed does not constitute 
a binding contract without the consent of the passenger or shipper, and that 
there is no basis for estoppel, as in the Hart case, si1pra, seems better law. 
Homer v. Railroad, 42 Utah, IS; St. Lcuis, I. M. & S. Ry. CO". v. Faulkner, 
III Ark. 430. In Ferris v. Mimieapoli; & St. L. Ry. Co., I73 N. W. 178, in 
a baggage cas-e arising under a state statute similar to the Hepburn Act, it 
was likewise held that there must be a valid contract fairly assented to by 
the passenger, and that the contract must be a reasonable limitation, the 
burden of proof being on the carrier to prove the contract. At any rate, to 
apply the result of the decisions to one traveling from Canada is carrying a 
bad thing too far. And to say that the Act meant to include travelers from 
an adjacent foreign country, as well as those to such country, it is submitted, 
is judicial legislation. True, in lntematio11al Paper Co. v. D. & H. Co., 33 
I. C. C. ZJO, as Justice Brandeis says, the Commission placed that construc-
tion on the Act, but that controversy concerned a difference in rates between 
Canada and the United States, and the Commission held that it had authority 
over all carriers within the limits of the United States, without regard to 
direction of shipments. Yet it held the rate established by the Canadian 
Commission to be reasonable, and that comity demanded that it be not 
changed. T. & P. Ry. Co. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 197, cited, says, in a dictum, 
that the Act was meant to apply to the whole field of commerce except intra-
state, but this was not necessary to the decision. But perhaps this decision, 
like that in the Pierce case, supra, will agitate better legislation on this matter. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LA.w-CoNCURRF;NT PowER UNDER TP.:E EilaITn:NTH 
A:r.n:NDYENT.-Habeas corpus proc~dings against sheriff for detaining plain-
tiff, who was arrested for violating the prohibition law of the state. Plaintiff 
maintains that the Volstead Act superseded and abrogated all state laws on 
the subject, and hence there was no state law in existence. Held, the power 
of ~he state is equal to that of Congress in passing laws on this subject, so 
the state law was not abrogated. Jones v. Hicks (Georgia, 1920), 104 S. 
E. 771. 
For a discussion of the meaning of "concurrent power" under the Eigh-
teenth Amendment., see 19 MICH. L. Rl;v. 329. The opinion in the principal 
case goes so far as to say that Congressional legislation cannot interfere 
with the enactment of any future legislation by the states to enforce pro-
hibition. This gives to Congress and the states equal power. This suggests 
the analogy of concurrent jurisdiction exercised by states over the waters 
of a river forming the boundary between them. See Wedding v. Meyler, 
192 U. S. 573; Neilson v. Oregon, 212 U. S. ~ns; supra, p. 331. But Justice 
White, in Rhode lsla11d v. Palmer, 40 Sup. Ct. 486, said that the object of 
the second section of the amendment was to adjust the matter to our dual 
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system of government. To hold that Congress and the states have equal 
power here would change the dual system. In Gibbons v. Ogdm, 9 Wheat. 1, 
at p. 2u, Chief Justice Marshall said that state laws enacted by the states in 
the e;x:ercise of their acknowledged sovereignty, not transcending their powers, 
must give way to laws passed by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution 
where contrary to them, for the Acts of Congress are supreme. See I¥isco11-
.sfo v. Duluth, g6 U. S. 379. In Keller v. U. S., 213 U. S. rJS, which held that 
an Act of Congress was invalid because it encroached upon the police power 
of the state, Justice Brewer says, at p. I45: "Doubtless it not infrequently 
happens that the same act may be referable to the power of the state as wetl 
as to that of Congress. If there be collision in such cases the supericr 
authority of Congress prevails." The principal case relies on E:r parte 
Guerra, no At!. 224. In that case the plaintiff, convicted under a state pro-
hibition law, maintained that the war-time Prohibition Act of Congress 
superseded all state legislation, but it was held that Congress acted under 
valid war power and the state under a valid exercise of its police pow:er, .and 
that the state statute does not yield to that of Congress unless its enforce-
ment conflicts with the Acts of Congress. It was, in that case, held not to 
conflict. It is submitted that any proper adjustment to our dual system of 
government requires the state statute to yield in case of manifest repugnance 
to the Act of Congress. See City of Shreveport v. Marx (La., I920), 86 
So. 002. . 
CoNSTITUTION.AI, LAw-Dus Prulcsss-Exs:r.i:PT10N oF FAR:r.i:r.a FRoM FooD 
CoNTROL UNDSR Lsvn AC'r.-Under section four of the Lever Act it is made 
unlawful for persons to perform any acts lmowingly in an attempt to enhance 
prices, or prevent production, to cripple transportation of necessaries, or to 
attempt to acquire a monopoly of such necessaries, and it is also made pun-
ishable by fine or imprisonment for persons to combine or conspire to accom-
plish such ends. It is also provided that this section. shall not apply to 
farmers or assoc.iations of farmers, and upon the basis that this was a classi-
fication without a reasonable basis it was held that this section of the Act 
was irwalid. U.S. v, Yount (D. C., W. I?., Pa., I920), 267 Fed. Rep. 861. 
It is unquestioned that the separate states in the exercise of their police 
powers may subject the citizen to such restraint, to be enforced by ·reason-
able regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. To do 
this, classification of the differe~t subjects or persons to be regulated is 
always permissible so long as the classification rests upon some difference 
bearing a reasonable and just relation to the subject matter in respect to 
which the classification is proposed. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 
U. S. 540, 4) L. Ed. 679. Yet this classification may not be arbitrary and 
without reasonable basis. The court in the principal case, fotlowing the 
precedent in the Connolly case, takes the stand that since the purpose of the 
act is to prevent the hoarding, the monopolizing, the manipulation of neces-
saries so as to raise prices and to allow profiteering, the exemption of the 
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farmer was omitting a class subject to the same temptations to combine for 
these purposes as any other class, and thus there was no reasonable basis for 
such a discrimination. Yet this stand is subject to the criticisms that appear 
in Mr. Justice McKenna's dissenting opinion in that case, in which he takes 
the view that the legislature has a wide range of discretion in the matter of 
classification, and that there is no evidence in the case to show that there 
was not a valid reason for legislating against combinations in the hands of 
traders, persons, and corporations, and exempting producers. The American 
Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 8g, 21 Sup. Ct. 43, seems authority for 
such a classification, despite the fact -that it is distinguished in the Connolly 
case, for, in the Sugar Refi1iing Company case a certain tax is imposed upon 
the manufacturers of sugar and not upon the growers of that article, while 
in the principal case certain conduct is merely penalized as to certain classes 
in which farmers and associations of farmers are not included.· ·Other 
grounds for regarding this a supportable classification appear in the fact 
that the aim of the Lever Act as a whole was to aid the production of neces-
sities. That the legislature saw fit to exempt farmers from the section pun-
ishing monopolies, combinations in restraint of transportation, profiteering, 
etc., indicates that the legislators evidently considered that the danger of 
such evils was not so great in the case of this particular class of producers 
and that they considered that the need for farm product5' was so great as to 
warrant encouraging farmers to the extent of allowing them a free hand in 
the means that they might take to strengthen their position. Certainly there 
are distinct differences in the situation of the farming class, and it seems 
that the legislature might be left to determine the relation of these differ-
ences to the acts declared invalid. In analogous case5' similar exemptions 
have not been regarded as arbitrary, though class distinctions are scarcely as 
marked as in the principal case. In State v. McKay, 137 Tenn. 28o, 193 S. 
W. 99, certain restrictions placed upon the seller of seeds were not applied 
to the farmer vendor in certain kinds of sales, and this was held not a vio-
lation of the "equal protection" clause of the Constitution because such sales 
were probably less open to the practice of deception. Whether the dangers 
of combines and conspiracies on the part of farmers to raise prices are pro-
portionately more in the principal case than danger of deception in the case 
just mentioned seems doubtful. Jn St. John v. New York, 201 U. S. 518, 30 
Sup. Ct. 443, the non-producing vendor of milk was made liable "by statute 
to certain fines and penalties to which the producing vendor was not liable 
on a showing that the milk was in the same condition as at the time when 
it had left the herd. Whether there is a more valid distinction between sttch 
classes and those established by the Lever act in the present case is open to 
question. 
CoNS'rlTUTIONAL LAw-Pow!R oii L!GlSLA'l'URE ro REGULA'l'E REN'l'AL 
RATES.-In an action by a landlord to recover possession the tenant relied 
upon the Ball Rent Law passed by Congress for the regulation of the busi-
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
ness 'of renting property in the District of Columbia. Held, that the Rent 
Law was invalid, inasmuch as there is no devotion of rented property to a 
''public use." Hfrsh v. Block (C. C. A., D. C., 1920), 267 Fed. 614. 
In the exercise of its police power a state may regulate rates charged in 
businesses "affected with a public interest." .Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. u3: 
Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517; Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391; 
German Alli<mce Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 38g. Congress possesses 
all the police power within the Distr-ict of Columbia that a state legislature 
has within its state. Washington Terminal Co. v. District of Columbia, 36 
App. D. C. 186, 191; District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 147, 149. The 
majority of the court in the principal case refused to differentiate between 
a "public interest" and: a "public use," and explained .Munn v. Illinois, supra, 
as based upon the fact that the owner of the grain elevator in that case had 
devoted it to a public use in handling gra!n for the public generally. The 
dissenting opinion in the principal case points out that the argument was 
advanced in the Munn case and its' succes5or5' that the owne;s of.the property 
in question were private individuals, doing a private busines~ ·without any 
privilege or monopoly granted to them by the state; yet it was held that their 
property was affected with a "public interest." Against these considerations 
"tlte court opposed the ever existing police power in government and its 
necessary exercise for the public good, and d·ectared its entire accommoda-
tion to the limitations of the Constitution." German Alliance Insurance Co. 
v. Lewis, supra. In the case last mentioned ·the business of fire insurance 
was held to be affected with a "public interest" and subject to regulation. 
See 28 HARv. L. Rtv. 84 for a discussion of this case. The idea that a 
"public interest" is synonymous with a "public use" has been advocated in 
every case from Munn v. Illinois to the German Alliance case, and has found 
favor only in the dissenting opinions. In the exercise of the war-power 
Congress regulated prices of necessaries, yet even the war-power can touch 
only "business affected with a public interest," and clearly there was no devo-
tion of property to a "public use." See Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 266 Fed. 
785. Whether or not Congress is justified' in declaring the rent business 
affected with a public interest under the conditions prevailing in the District 
of Columbia, it seems clear that the statute cannot be disposed of by a con-
clusion that there is no "public use"' involved. For a more extended discus-
sion as to the scope of the phrase "businesses affected with a public interest," 
see 19 MICH. L. IU:v. 74-
CoNSTlTUTlONAL LAW-!U:PtAL OF TAX EXEMPTION AS IMPAIRMENT OF 
CoNTRAcT.-Under a New York statute of 1853 (Laws of 1853, c. 462) the 
relator's property was exempt from taxation above the value of $30,000. 
This statute was repealed. by an act of 1909 (Acts of 1909, c. 201), and there-
after the assessors of the City of Troy placed a value of one million dollars 
upon the relator's property, upon which valuation city taxes were assessed. 
In an action to set aside the taxes so assessed, the relator claims that the 
:epeal of the act of 1853 effected an impairment of his contract, embodied 
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in that act, contrary to the contract clause of the Federal Constitution (Art. 
I, § 10). Held, assessment should be sustained. People e:r rel. Troy Union 
Ry. Co. v. Mealy et al. (1920), 4I Sup. Ct. Rep. 17. 
The courts are not inclined to view claims for exemption from taxation 
favorably. Tucker v. Ferguson, 8g U. S. 527. And will not find a contract 
in a statute granting such exemption unless there is quid pro quo. Ry. Co. 
v. Supervisors, 93 U. S. 5g6. To the contrary, where it appears that the 
party exempted furnished no consideration, the exemption is simply a prom-
ise of a gratuity, 511ontaneously made, and subjest to repeal at the pleasure 
of the legislature. Christ Church v. Phila. County, 65 U. S. 300. Mere action. 
in reliance upon the statute will not be held good consideration. Ry. Co. v. 
Powers, I9I U. S. 379. But even where a consideration has been given, an 
express reservation of power to repeal, in the act itself or in the state con-
stitution, will give the legislature the right to withdraw the privilege at will. 
Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13; Calder v. Michigan, 218 U. S. 59I. 
A grant of privileges coµtained in a corporate charter stands upon a some-
what different footing. In such a case the precedent of Dartmouth College 
v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, precludes the court from holding that a grant 
of exemption is 11ud11m pactmn. Owensboro v. Telephone Co., 230 U. S. 58. 
The decision in the principal case rests upon a solid foundation in that the 
relator furnished no consideration for the exemption, and furthermore, that 
the right of repeal was reserved in Art. VIII, § I of the Constitution of 
New York. 
CRIMINAL LAW-WAIV£R oF CoNFRONTATION.-During the progress of 
the defendant's trial on the charge of rape the state offered in evidence, 
without objection on the part of the accused: or his counsel, the testimony 
of the prosecutrix as taken before the grand jury. Counsel for the state 
and for the defendant were present in the grand jury room when the evi-
dence was given, and both agreed to the use of the testimony at the trial. 
Held, the defendant had waived his constitutional right to be confronted by 
the witness, notwithstanding the fact that the stipulation had been made by 
an attorney appointed by the court to represent the accused. Denson v. 
State (Ga., 1920). 104 S. E. 78o. 
- By the federal. constitution and the constitutions of most of the states, 
in a criminal proceeding the accused has a -right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him. I WIGMORE Ev., Sec. I3g6. The authorities are prac-
tically uniform on the proposition that this right of confrontation. is a per-
sonal privilege which the accused can waive. Smith v. State, I45 Wis. 612, 
I30 N. W. 46!; State v. Williford, III Mo. App. 668, 86 S. W. 570; 2 BISHOP, 
NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [2d Ed.], Sec. I205; 16 C. J. 840. The waiver 
may be either by express consent, as where the accused agrees to the reading 
oi depositions taken elsewhere; by failure to assert the right in time; or by 
conduct inconsistent with a purpose to insist on it. State v. Mitchell, ng N. 
C. 874, 25 S. E. 873; CHAMBERLAYNE, Ev., Sec. 462. According to the great 
weight of authority an express agreement or stipulation made by counsel for 
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, an accused, in reference to a waiver of the right of confrontation, has the 
same effect as if made by the defendant himself. Rosenbaum v. State, 33 
Ala. 354. And as Cooley, J., pointed out in People v. Murray, 52 Mich. 288, 
17 N. W. 843, it makes no difference whether the stipulation is made by 
counsel employed by the accused or by counsel appointed by the court for 
the accused. Texas alone seems to hold that the waiver, to be binding, must 
be made by the accused himself. Allen v. State, 16 Tex. App. 237. The 
latter tribunal seemingly forgets that the attorney is the accused's personal 
representative at the trial and acts for him; it also overlooks the fact that 
even though the accused may have had no voice in the selection of the 
appointed counsel, he could have objected in due time to the stipulation and 
waiver. In the instant case he offered no objection until after the verdict 
was rendered against him. Logically, the accused here can hardly complain, 
considering the further fact that his counsel had cross-examined the witness 
whose testimony was read at the trial. "The main and essential purpose of 
confrontation,is to secure the opportunity of cross-examination." 2 W1c-
MO~, Ev., Sec. 1395, This is the' primary right the constitutional provision 
mainly guarantees; and once this opportu~ity and nght are had.and enjoyed 
by the accused he cannot claim :that he was denied due process of law . 
. Dr:r:ns-Dr:r.IV£RY-GRAN'.l'OR Rr:'.l'AINlNG Possr:ss10N.-The defendants 
claimed land under an instrument, signed, sealed and acknowledged by the 
grantor. The latter, during his life, retained possession of the land and of 
the instrument; he gave the latter to no one at any time, and he made no 
declarations regarding it, its existence being unknown until after his death, 
when it was found among his papers. In an action by the heirs of the 
grantor for partition, it was held that there had been no valid delivery of the 
instrument. Mt1mpower v. Castle (Sup. Ct. App., Va., 1920), 104 S. E. 7o6. 
The defendants claimed under an instrument, signed, sealed and acknowl-
edged by ·the grantor (testator), who in his will spoke of land which he 
had "deeded" to the defendant, and said that the deed would be found with 
the will. Apparently, the deed was signed: and acknowledged some time 
after the will was made, for it bore a later date than the will. After the 
testator's death it was found, signed and acknowledged, along with the will. 
In a suit by two grandchildren of the testator ,for partition, it was held that 
there had been a valid delivery of the deed. Payne v. Payne (Sup. Ct. App., 
Va., 1920), 104 S. E. 712. 
Delivery of a deed, as the court points out, is essentially a matter of 
intention on the part of the grantor to consummate the transaction as far as 
he is concerned'; i. e., to have the instrument operate presently as a convey-
ance. The cases above, .recognizing that manual transfer of possession is 
unnecessary, nevertheless hold that even where an instrument is signed, 
sealed, and acknowledged there must be some other circumstance or word 
or act of the grantor showing an intention on his part to have the instru-
ment operate presently as a conveyance ini order to constitute a valid delivery. 
The weight of authority supports this doctrine that delivery is an affirmative 
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act, as essential to the validity of the deed as the signing or sealing, and 
being a distinct . requisite for validity, must be proved by the one claiming 
under the instrument. Fain v. Smith, 14 Ore. 82, 58 Am. Rep. 281; Fishe,. 
v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416; Boyd v. Slayback, 63 Cal. 493. In the second: case, the 
language used by the testator in his will ·regarding the deed,·and his subse-
quent action in acknowledging the deed and placing it with his wj\l were 
.considered as clearly indicating his intention to make it then operative as 
his deed. For a very similar case see Toms v. Owen, 52 Fed. 417. See also 
17 MICH. L. ruv. 344 and references given there. There are misleading state-
ments in certain cases cited in Payne v. Payne, supra, to the effect that the 
signing, sealing and acknowledging of a voluntary conveyance raise a prima 
facie presumption of its delivery. The language, however, was unnecessary 
to the decision of the cases cited and is impossible to reconcile with elementary 
principles of the law as to delivery. 
EQUITY-UNCLEAN HANDS.-Plaintiff was a corporation gtvmg chiro-
practic lessons by mail, and had built up its business by false, misleading, 
and fraudulent advertising. Defendant, a former president of the plaintiff 
company, started a rival institution and took with him a list of plaintiff's 
present and prospective pupils, and sent letters to them derogatory to plain-
tiff, and calculated to draw its pupils away. The defendant built up his busi-
ness by the same kind of fraudulent advertising. Plaintiff asked for an 
injunction to restrain defendant from sending out any more such letters. 
Held, the plaintiff's unclean: hands preclude equity from giving the relief 
asked. A111erica1i University v. Wood, 128 N. E. 330 (Ill., 1920). 
The court in the principal case lays down the broad proposition that 
equity will not aid a litigant in the promotion of a fraud on the public, 
although his wrong did not affect the private rights ,of the defend'ant, and 
had no necessary connection with defendant's wrong-doing, citing Primeau 
v. Gra1ifield, 193 Fed. 9u, in which, there being a suit to declare a trust and 
for an accounting between plaintiff and defendant, who were engaged in a 
fraudulent joint enterprise for the sale of worthless mining stock to the 
public, the court dismissed the bill, holding the plaintiff had not come into 
~ourt with clean hands·. The Trade Mark or Trade Name cases, 4 A. L. R: 
32, .note, in which plaintiff asks for an injunction to restrain an infringe-
ment, are the most numerous and important type in which the courts have 
applied the doctrine of unclean hands, as in Worden v. Califoniia Fig Syrup 
Co., 187 U. S. 516, where an injunction restraining an infringement on the 
trade name, "Syrup of Figs," was refused, the court holding that the name 
was a fraud: on the public, as the product contained no fig syrup, but was 
merely an extract of senna, and dismissed the bill because of the plaintiff's 
unclean hands. In Memphis Keeley Institute v. Leslie E. Keeley Co., 155 
Fed. g64, plaintiff asked an injunction. to restrain defendants from adminis-
tering their remedies, and to cancel the contract. The court found that the 
so-called "Gold Cure" contained no gold, although the sale of the medicine 
had been built up by representations to that effect, and held that as this 
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advertising amounted to a fraud on the public, equity would not interfere 
where plaintiff's hands were unclean. In both this case and the principal 
one the rule that the misrepresentation must be directly connected with the 
subject matter of the suit (Shaver v. Heller, 1o8 Fed. 821, 834), was consid-
ered inapplicable. In Coca Cola Co. v. Koke Co. (U. S S. Ct., October term, 
1920), 41 Sup. Ct. u3, the court sustained an injunction against an infringe-
ment of the name "Coca Cola," in spite of the objection that the name was a 
deceit on the public. In reversing the conclusion in 255 Fed. 894, and modify-
ing and affirming the holding in 235 Fed. 4o8, the court decided that there was 
no fraudulent advertising in the case, and that although the name was derived 
from a derivative of cocaine, and now, as a matter of fact, the drink con-
tained no cocaine, yet the public asked for the beverage itself, and not for 
a drink with the expectation of getting cocaine in it. From a consideration 
of these cases it would seem that the Illinois court in its broad application 
of the rule was justified in principle, although none of the cases considered 
has· stated or applied it so liberally. 
EvmtNct-TSSTIHONY oF THF. Dtc:i;AsF.D G1vtN AFTER THE Tun~ oF THI! 
ACCIDENT IS ADMISSmr.:io: AS p AR't OF Rr:s GssTA:io:.-Statements made by the 
deceased after being shot that the defendant had attacked and robbed him, 
though made some time after the a~cident, held admissible as part of the 
res gestae, since there had been no opportunity to deliberate on the effect 
of the words. Solice v. State (Ariz., 1920), 193 Pac. 19. 
The doctrin~ of res gestae, as a basis for the admission of evidence, may 
be summarized, in a limited sense, as the practice of admitting the entire 
collection of primary facts constituting the immediate and necessary field 
of judicial inquiry in the particular case. This may involve the admission 
of declarations and statements that might otherwise be classed as hearsay 
evidence, even though these statements may not have occurred at the time 
or at the place of the principal occurrence. A further inquiry into the exact 
nature of the doctrine of res gestae reveals the fact that it has been applied 
as a loose name covering several more definite rules fer admitting evidence, 
the more important of which are spontaneous exclamations or statements, 
statements admissible under the verbal act doctrine, statements showing men-
tal condition, and statements admissible as part of the issue- under the pl~d­
ings, and others. This confusion of several distinct bases for the admission 
of evidence has in many cases led to confusion of the elements necessary 
for the admission of evidence of the type involved in the principal case, 
and more technically known as spontaneous exclamations. Spontaneous 
exclamations, as an exception to the hearsay rule, are admissible when, 
because of the elemenll: of the time of making such exclamations and the 
circumstances of making, it is evidi:nt that the words have been emitted 
spontaneously and without previous reflection on their effect. Untrustworthi-
ness being the basis of the hearsay rule, it is the spontaneity of this partic-
ular form of res gestae that insures their truth and forms the basis of the 
exception. Hence the elements necessary for the presence of this guaranty 
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seem to be a startling occasion, a statement made before there is time for 
fabrication, the content of which relates to the circumstances of the occur-
rence. A number of courts in treating matters coming distinctly under the 
head of spontaneous utteram:es of this kind have confused the requirements 
with those of other forms of res gestae, and particularly with those of verbal· 
acts. The elements of a verbal act are either that the words must be a 
part of the issue under the substantive law involved or must be such as to 
give a certain legal significance to the principal occurrence, and such state-
ments have generally been held only to be admissible if those of the actor 
and if precisely contemporaneous in time with the principal act. Courts, 
then, in confusing these two classes of evidence have called statements made 
after the time of the accident and not in exclamatory form "narrative," and 
exclude such statements on the basis that they are not a part of, contempo-
raneous with, or having a particular bearing on the principal act, without 
considering that the real necessity is that such statements must merely be 
made under such circumstances as to guarantee their truthfulness. In Car-
roll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 935, the court considers that the 
mere fact that the statement was in narrative form sufficient reason for 
excluding it. Other such cases are: Vicksburg M. R. Co. v. O'Brien, ug 
U. S. 99; Dampier v. Lewis, 131 Mich. 144; Clark v. Electrical Suppl)• Co., 
72 Mo. App. 5o6; Ruschenberg v. So. Blee. R. Co., 161 Mo. 70, 6I S. W. 626. 
fo Butler v. M. Ry. Co., 143 N. Y. 417, 38 N. E. 454. the court does not seem 
to consider spontaneous utterance as a basis for the admission of evidence, 
but stated that statements were admissible only when unfolding the char-
acter or quality of the principal act. Williums v. So. Pac. Co., 133 Cal. 550, 
goes so far as to intimate that narration in any form, even though given 
during the time of the principal occurrences in question, may be excluded. 
It is evident that if so strict a rule were consistently followed most spon-
taneous utterances would be entirely excluded. This case also follows 
another element of the verbal act doctrine in its intimation that only prin-
cipal actors' statements are so admissible, while the spontaneous exclama-
tions of chance witnesses have generally been admitted if the other neces-
sary guaranties of trustworthiness are present. Other cases following the 
principal case in admitting statements of this kind when the· necessary ele-
ments of trustworthiness are present are: Louis v Ill. Cen. R. Co., 140 La. L; 
Freemen v. Ins. Co., 195 S. W. 545; Daly v. Pr)w:. 197 Mo. App. 583, 1g8 S. 
W. 91. For a full collection of cases of this type, see 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 918. 
!NSURANCE-DSATH \VHILr: IN Mn.1TARY Sr:RVICE.-A life insurance pol-
icy provided, "If, within five years from the date of this policy, the insured 
shal.l engage in military or vaval service in time of war, the liability of the 
company, in event of the death of the insured while so engaged * * * shalt 
be. limited to the return of the regular premium * * *" After the issuance 
of the policy the insured was inducted: into military service under the pro-
visions of the Selective Service Law, and died of pneumonia in a hospital 
at Camp Taylor, Kentucky. In an action by his administrator to recover the 
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face value of the policy, it was held, the company was not liable. Bradshaw 
v. Farmers' and Bankers' Life Ins. Co. (Kans., 1920), 193 Pac. 332. 
A life insurance policy contained this provision : "'!'his policy is incon-
testible after one year from date of issue * * *: Provided, however, that it 
is especially understood and agreed that, in case of the death of the insured 
while engaged in any military or naval service in time of war, the beneficiary"' 
shall recover a sum equal to the total premiums paid', etc. The insured 
enlisted in the naval service of the United States during the Great War, and 
died of pneumonia while at his home on furlough shortly after the Armis-
tice. In an action by his administrator, held, the company was liable for the 
full amount of the policy. Long v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App., 1920), 
225 S. W. lo6. 
The problem of these cases is discussed and the cases reviewed in 18 
MICH. L. Rtv. 686. See also Ibid. Sor. Since those notes several cases, in 
addition to the principal cases, have been decided. Mattox v. New England 
Mut: Life Ins. Co. (Ga. App., 1920), 103 S. E. l8o, where without discussion 
of the point the court held the company not liable for the full amount; 
Slaughter v. Protective League Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App., 1920), 223 S. W. 
8rg, where recovery was limited to the premiums paid; Sandstedt v. Amer-
icati Cent. Life Ins. Co. (Wash., r920), 186 Pac. lOOg, where also the recovery 
was limited, though the discussion was on another point. Apparently, the 
co~flicting views of the Courts of Appeals i1JJ Missouri will be settled by the 
Supreme Court of that state, for the Long case, supra, is certified to the 
higher court. 
lNSURANct--lNVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER OF INS~D BY B.ENF.FlCIARY 
Dor:s NOT BAR RtcoV.ERY.-The beneficiary of a life insurance policy, through 
his gross negligence, caused the death of the insured. In an action by the 
beneficiary against the insurer, it was held that even though the plaintiff was 
guilty of involuntary manslaughter under the Penal Code, that fact would 
not defeat his action. Throop v Western Indemnity Co. (Cal., 1920), 193 
Pac. 263. 
It is contrary to public policy to permit a person who wilfully kills 
another to enforce through the courts the contract for the payment of insur-
ance upon the life of the person ki11ed. New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Armstrong, n7 U. S. 591; Anderson v. Life Ins. Co., I52 N. C. I. See 
24 HARV. L. Rtv. 227. The rule forbidding such recovery is analogous to 
that prevailing in fire insurance, where the fire is set by the insured. 4 
CooLtY ON INSURANCE, 3154 The reason given for the existence of the pub-
lic policy is that to allow a recovery would furnish the party interested the 
strongest temptation to bring about the event insured against and would 
encourage crime. The killing in the present case was accidental, and as far 
as the wording of the contract is concerned a recovery should be allowed. 
There would, however, seem to be considerable room for argument whether 
the same rule of public policy which operates in the case of a wilful killing 
should not apply in the present case. Allowing the plaintiff to recover in 
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this case places a premium upon gross negligence. The court madf! no men-
tiol'll of public policy in the principal case, nor did the Illinois court in the 
case of Shreiner v. High Court of I. C. O. of F., 35 Ill. App. 576. In the 
latter case the court said that a contract of insurance impliedly assumes the 
risk of all carelessness. by every person, whether a possible beneficiary under 
the contract or not; therefore, a death which is unintentional, though caused 
by some neglect or unlawful act of the beneficiary, is within the contract, 
and ought not to defeat the policy. See L. R A. 1917B, 1210. 
JuDGts-PRovts10N FOR ExP£NS£S NO'.r INCR£AS£ oF CoMP£NS.\'.rlON.-
Where by statute the Missouri legislature allowed probate judges a cer-
tain sum for the payment of necessary expenses while engaged in holding 
court, it was held that such allowance did not constitute additional "compen-
sation" within the constitutional provision that the compensation of a public 
officer should not be increased or diminished during his term of office. 
Macon County v. Williams (Mo., 1920), 224 S. W. 835. 
It seems to have been almost universally held that any allow~nce for 
expenses incident to the discharge of the duties of office, in addition to the 
salary provided by law, is not an increase of salary or compensation, a per-
quisite, nor an emolument of office, forbidden by the United States Consti-
tution and the constitutions of practically all of the states. McCoy v. Hand-
lin, 35 S. D. 487, 153 N. W. 361; Milwaukee County v. Halsey, 149 Wis. 82, 
136 N. W. 139. The test of validity is: Was the purpose of the legislahtre 
to increase the salary or was its purpose merely to save such salary, so (hat 
the officer would, in fact, receive the whole thereof for the performance of 
his official duties? The constitutional prohibition is aimed at the former 
alone. It was framed in the public interest that the judiciary may be inde-
pendent of the other departments, on the ground that, as Hamilton put it, 
"A power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will" (F£n-
llRALIS'.r, No. 79). True, the power to allow or withhold sums for expenses 
may give the legislature some hold on the judiciary, yet courts h~ve con-
sistently confined the prohibition to increases or decreases of the compen-
sation for services rendered, allowing the appropriation of special sums for 
traveling and other incidental expenses of office. Such appropriations do 
not add to the salary; they merely insure the official's full enjoyment of ir. 
Kirkwood v. Soto, 87 Cal. 394. 25 Pac. 488; Smith v. Jackson, 241 Fed. 770 
(approved, 246 U. S. 388, 62 L. Ed. 788); State v. Sheldon, 78 Neb. 552, 111 
N. W. 372. Yet, in a recent case the United: States Supreme Court declared 
that the prohibition was applicable both to direct and indirect changes in 
salaries, and, reversing the lower court decision, held that the income tax 
on the salaries of federal judges violated this constitutional provision. Evans 
v. Gore (U. S. S. C., 1920), 64 L. Ed.-, 40 Sup. Ct. 550. It seems absurd 
to say that while the allowance of expenses to judges does not violate 
the provision, the taxation of the salaries of judges in common. with those 
of other citizens does violate it. This tax is not such a diminution of 
judges' salaries as to bring the judiciary within reach of the legislative 
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department, nor would it cause any suspicion of influence that might tend 
to shape their decisions, since the tax is on all "incomes from whatever 
source derived." The judge's claim for salary is unimpaired; the amount 
of income remains the same; the.deduction comes later when the govern-
ment comes to collect taxes from all citizens, whatever be their position or 
place. See 18 MICH. L. R£v. 6<.t;. The purpose of a constitutional provision 
must guide courts in it& application, and it is submitted that if the independ-
ence of the judiciary is not tampered with by allowances for expenses it 
certainly is not violated by a tax laid on all citizens alike. See dissenting 
opinion in Evans v. Gore, supra. 
LANDLORD AND T£NANT-MODt oF UTn.IZATION oF PR£:i.r1s£S-Co~sTauc­
TION OF COV£NANT NOT TO Usr: FOR l:r.IMORAJ, PRACTI~s.-A lease contained 
the covenant, "that the lessee will not keep or allow any hquor or beverages 
of any intoxicating nature or tendency, kept or tolerated on said premises, 
nor any gambling, or other immoral practices." The tenant used the prem-
ises as a book store and sold certain books of an immoral character. In an 
action by the landlord in forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the trial court 
found (F) that there had been a default in the payment of rent, and (:?) 
that the premises had been used for immoral practices within the scope of 
the covenant in the lease. A statute .empowered the tenant to reinstate his 
rights under the lease by payment of the rent at any time before possession 
was taken by the landlord under legal proceedings. Admitting the default 
in payment of rent, it thus became necessary for the court to pass upon the 
second finding in order to determine whether or not the tenant could exer-
cise his statutory power. Held, in view of the lease describing the premises 
as a book store, a prohibition on the kind cf books to be sold was not within 
the contemplation of the parties at the time of the execution of the lease. 
A construcition of the words, "or other immoral practices," in view of their 
following directly after the specification of gambling or keeping of intoxi-
cating liquors, must be confined to practices generally understood to be sub-
versive to common decency, such as allowing the premises to be used as a 
bawdy house or for lewd dancing. Paust v. Georgian (Minn., 1920), 179 
N. W. 735. 
Generally, the tenant is not restricted in the use of the leased premises 
except by statute or express provision in the lease. Taylor v. Finnegan, 18g 
Mass. 568, 76 N. E. 203; Heise v. Penn. Ry. Co., 62 Penn. 67. Where the 
tenant is prohibited from ttsing the premises for certain specified trades or 
any other noisome or offensive trade, such words as those italicized are con-
strued as relating only to trades ejusdem generis with those which have 
already been set out in particular in the covenant. Witherell v. Bird, 2 Ad'ot. 
& E. 161; Jones v, Thorne, I Barn. & C. 715; I TIIIFANY, LAND. & T£N., § 
123 d. There seems to be no reason why the same principle should not be 
adhered to in the principal case; for it is self-evident that gambling is not 
in the same category as the sate of certain immoral books which are among 
those kept in a general stock in trade. · 
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Lma-PuBI.ICATION TO AGJ::NT.-Boltz and wife ordered a stove of the 
defendant company, giving their joint note therefor. Young, an agent of 
the stove company, was given the original order with the words "no good" 
written across the face thereof, and directed not to deliver the stove unless 
he could collect $57 which was not called for by the contract of sale. As 
Boltz was working away from home, he asked a neighbor, Faulk, to assist 
in receiving, unloading and placing the stove. Young showed the said order 
to Faulk and to Mrs. Boltz, in explanation of his demand for the payment. 
Held, it was unnecessary to decide whether the words were libelous per se, 
for there was no publication. Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Boltz (Miss., 1920), 
86 South. 354-
The court reasons that showing the alleged libelous words to the wife 
was no publication, for she was jointly interested in the contract, and show-
ing them to Faulk was no publication, for he was the agent of Boltz and 
simply stood in his place. No authority was cited for either proposition. 
The first, however, seems clear upon principle, but the second is more doubt-
ful. Authority precisely in point is scarce. The statement that communica-
tion to any person other than the plaintiff is sufficient publication, SAI.MOND 
ox ToRTs, 412; Jozsa v. Moroney, 125 La. 813, is too broad in the light of 
many recent cases, some of which are cited, infra. But this is the rule, and 
contrary cases are exceptions. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185, 
is contrary to the principal case. The publication there consisted of the sale 
of a newspaper to the agent of the plaintiff, sent purposely to make the pur-
chase. Wright v. Great Northern R. R. Co., 186 S. W. 1o85 (Mo., 1916), is 
also contra, but is without value here because placed by the court, unneces-
sarily, it seems, upon a special state statute. In Brown v. Elm City Lumber 
Co., 167 N. C. 9, and Alabama & Vicksburg R.R. Co. v. Brooks, 69 Miss. 
168, the sending of libelous letters to the plaintiffs' attorneys in response to 
claims presented by the said attorneys for their respective clients, was held 
sufficient publication. Dickinson v. Hathaway, 122 La. 644 also an attorney 
case, seems contra to the two cases last cited, and to lend some support to 
the principal case, but therein the matter of publication is badly confused 
with that of privilege. Such a doctrine certainly finds no support in Jozsa 
v. M oro11ey, supra. On principle, it is hard to see why the plaintiff was not 
as much danmified by the exposure of the order to this particular neighbor 
whom he had asked to help receive the stove as to any other person. The 
temporary agency was neither prevention nor cure for the injury to his 
reputation. The court in the instant case passes without notice another very 
interesting question, to-wit, whether the handing of the libelous paper by 
the company to their agent, Young, was not publication. On the authority 
of Bacon v. MiclP. Central R. R. Co., 55 Mich • .224; Ward v. Smith, 6 Bing. 
749; Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48; Pullman v. Hill [1891], 1 Q. B. 524, 
and the numerous cases following the Pull1nan case, it is submitted that this 
was publication. While the tendency is undoubtedly away from the Pullmall 
case, as far as publication to a stenographer in the course of business is con-
cerned, it is doubted if the court which gave the decision in Owen v. Ogilvie 
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Pub. Co., 32 App. Div . .¢5, and its many followers, would include a delivery-
man of merchandise in their "all one act'' theory. See further I7 MICH. !,. 
REV. I87, 346, and 19 MICH. L. Ri;:v. Io6, for the phase of the problem last 
discussed above. 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-RIGHT TO CONDEMN LAND FOR WATr.RWORKS 
IN ANOTHER STATE.-The states of Washington and Oregon enacted recipro· 
cal statutes providing that a municipal corporation of any adjoining state 
might acquire title to land or water rights within the state by purchase or 
condemnation for waterworks purposes. A city in Washington planned to 
issue bonds to construct a waterworks system which required the city to 
condemn lands in Oregon by virtue of the Oregon statute. A taxpayer 
sought to- enjoin the issuance of the bonds on the ground that the city could 
not exercise the power of eminent domain in another state and so could not 
lawfully proceed with the project. Held (four justices dissenting), that in 
view of the reciprocal statutes, the city may exercise the power of eminent 
domain in the other state, and that the injunction should be reftised. La11g-
don v. City of Walla Walla (Wash., I920), 193 Pac. I. 
The right of eminent domain, by constitutional provisions which prevail 
generally in the United States, is restricted to taking property for public use. 
LEWIS, EMINENT DoMAIN, § I. The .public use for which property may be 
taken is a public use within the state from which the power is derived. Gen-
erally speaking, one state cannot take or authorize the taking of property 
situated within its limits for the use of another state. NICHOI.S, EMINENT 
DoMAIN, § 29. If the state authorizing the use of the power benefits thereby, 
it is no objection that another state also benefits. Gilmer v. Lime Point, I8 
Cal. 229. The relative amount of direct benefit accruing inside and outside 
of the state i5' not material. Thus, property was taken to be used to prevent 
the water supply of two cities in the home state and one in a neighboring 
state from being polluted. Columb11s Water Works Co. v. Long, I2I Ala. 
245; and to increase the power of the condemner's electric plant located 
within the state 4750 horse-power, and of its plant located outside of the 
state I3,500 horse-power, Washington. Power Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho 595: 
and to construct a pipe-line serving a few people in West Virginia and many 
people in Pennsylvania, Carnegie Gas Co. v. Swiger, 72 W. Va. 557. It has 
been held that unless some direct benefit from the proposed use is to accrue 
to the state in which it is located, the state's power of eminent domain can-
not be used to. condemn property. In Grover Irrigation Co. v. Lovella Ditch 
Co., 2I Wyo. 204 the land sought to be condemned was to be used only to 
facilitate the irrigation of land in another state; the use of the power was 
refused. But indirect benefit to the state has also been recognized as suf-
ficient to justify the exercise of the power. Thus, the United States was 
permitted the state's right of eminent domain in Maryland for the purpose 
of furnishing a water supply to the District of Columbia, the court basing 
its decision. P!'-rtly on the ground that, as the United States benefited, Mary-
land as a part of the United States benefited also. Reddal! v. Bry'aii, I4 Md. 
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444. And in fo re Thomas, 39 N. Y. 171, the right of eminent domain wa-; 
exerted against land in New York to maintain a canal in New Jersey because 
of the benefit to the people of New York, though the canal was situated 
entirely in New Jersey; this benefit, a mere possibility, was that the people 
of New York could use the canal, since it terminated on the Hudson river. 
On the other hand, in the Grover irrigation Co. case, supra, although it was 
pointed out that certain cities in Wyoming would benefit from the resulting 
fertility of land in the neighborhood, the court considered this a111 indirect 
benefit and refu~ed to allow the exercise of the eminent domain power for 
such purpose. Thus, it appears that the requirement of benefit may be 
applied from a strict or a liberal viewpoint. From a strict viewpoint, the 
dissenting judges in the principal case are correct and the majority are not 
in accord with the weight of authority, for the reciprocal statute is at best 
only an indirect benefit to Oregon. But a treatment of the problem liberally, 
from the standpoint of reasonableness and desirability, would be better. 
From such a standpoirit the opinion of the majority is correct. In cases of 
irrigation and water-rights a view has been taken broader than that of the 
minority opinion. As long as Oregon, through its legislature, is willing to 
permit a foreign municipality to use its power of eminent domain, and the 
u;e of its land so acquired is a public one in the broad, liberal sense of the 
word, no citizen of Washington should be heard to object. 
Nu1sANO:-AIDlNG BF.TTING ON RAci;s !NDICTABLF..-D was indicted for 
the offense of maintaining a common and public nuisance. The evidence 
showed that he maintained a room in which he carried on a commission bet-
ting business. People would call him over the telephone and place bets with 
him on horse races; he received their bets and transmitted them to his father 
in New York, who would let him know if they were all right. They received 
money by check from D's father in New York or transmitted money to his 
New York office in case they lost the bet. There was no evidence of any 
disturbance or noise in or about the office of D, and his place of business 
was not known to the public generally. He was not indicted under the 
statute relating to betting on horse racing, but under the common law for a 
public nuisance. Held, he was guilty of maintaining a public nuisance by 
aiding betting in violation of law. Enright v. Commonwealth (Ky., 1920), 225 
s. w. 240. 
The decision is undoubtedly correct and follows the general rule. At 
common law any form of gambling was regarded as a nuisance because of 
its tendency to corrupt morals, disturb the community, and ruin fortunes, and 
it has been held that a pool room maintained to facilitate betting on horse 
races is a common law nuisance. State v. Vaughn, 81 Ark. 117; State v. 
Ayers, 49 Ore. 61. The decision in the principal case is based upon earlier 
Kentucky decisions. In Ehrlick v. Commonwealtli, 125 Ky. 742, which was 
a prosecution for maintaining a common nuisance (a pool room), the court 
said: "A nuisance per se is any act or commission or use of property or thing 
which is of itself hurtful to the health, tranquility, or morals, or outrages the 
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decency of the community. It is not permissible or excusable under any 
circumstances." fa James v. State, 4 Okla. Crim. Rep. 587, it is said that a 
house or place kept for the purpose of enabling persons to place bets or 
wagers upon horse races is a common gambling house, and is, therefore, a 
nuisance per se. See also Jones v. State (Okla.), 132 Pac. 319- In the Ehr-
lick case, supra, the court also held that where the thing is per se a nuisance, 
such as a pool room or gambling house, it is no defense that there was no 
noise or disturbance, nor that the community was not disturbed by its pres-
ence. This is supported by authority, Kfog v. People, 83 N. Y. 587, where it 
was held that it was not an essential element of the offense of keeping a 
disorderly or gaming house that the public should be disturbed by the noise. 
NmsANCE-ATTRACTIVr: Nu1sANC£-NEITHER CoFFER DAM NOR PoND Is.-
The Supreme Court of Iowa recently handed down two decisions on attrac· 
tive nuisances. In the one case, a railroad maintained a coffer dam in sup-
port of one of the piers of its bridge. A beam extended entirely around the 
dam. and the plaintiff's intestate (eight years old) was drowµed by the 
water within the dam by losing his balance in an attempt to walk the beam. 
In the other, the plaintiff's intestate (five years old) was drowned in a pond 
that was allowed by the railroad to remain undrained on its right of way. 
In both cases the plaintiff's right to recover was denied. Massing/tam v. 
Illinois Central Ry. Co. (Iowa, I920),. I70 N. W. 832; Blough v. Chicago 
Great Western R. Co. (Iowa, 1920), I79 N. W. 840. 
The trend of the decisions points to a refusal by the courts to extend 
the rule of attractive nuisance advanced in the turntable cases. 2 Coot.£Y, 
TORTS [Ed. 3], I272, n. 43. For cases representative of this tendency, see 
Ryan v. Towan, I28 Mich. 463 (water wheel); Sullivan v. Boston & Albany 
R. Co., I56 Mass. 378 (charged wire on the roof of a shed) ; Rogers v. Lees, 
140 Pa. St. 475 (hoisting apparatus); Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Cal. 214 (open 
cellar); O'Connor v. Brucker, u7 Ga. 475 (open door of a vacant house); 
Arnold v. St. Louis, I52 Mo. 173 (pond covered with ice). But see Comer 
v. City of Wi11ston-Salem (N. C .. I9I9), 100 S. E. 619, I8 MrcH. L. R£v. 340, 
where the city was held liable for failure to maintain a proper railing on its 
bridge. See also Ramsay v. Tuthill Building Material Co. (Ill., I920), I29 
N. E. 127, which arose over the death of a child smothered by sand in a 
bin in which deceased was, playing. 
NuISANCE-FUNERAI. HOME IN A Rr:SIDEN'tl.AI. Sr:CTION.-The defendants 
bought a house in an exclusive residential section and commenced to use it 
for the purpose of a funeral home in connection with their undertaking 
establishment, which was situated in another part of the city. They con-
structed a driveway entirely around the house for the purpose of parking 
funeral cars and carriages. The nature of the business required that bodies 
should be allowed to remain there from twenty-four to thirty-six hours. 
Services were held and funeral processions started from the home. The 
effect of the establishment was to impair materially the value of the sur-
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rounding property. In a suit by residents of the neighborhood. held, that 
although a funeral home is not a nuisance per se, under the circumstances 
of this case it must be held to be such: and an injunction will issue to 
restrain the use of the premises for that purpose. _l\feagller v. Kessler 
(Minn., 1920), I79 N. W. 733. 
The court places the funeral home in the same category as undertaking 
establishments, which uniformly have been held not to be nuisances per se. 
They become nuisances, however, when they are conducted in a residential 
district, and where their effect is to impair thf\ enjoyment of the neighboring 
premises and to decrease the value of the property in the neighborhood gen-
erally. There are but few cases on the subject, most of which are collected 
in a note to Goodrich v. Starrett, 108 Wash. 437, I84 Pac. 220, in 18 MICH. 
L. RE\'. 246. See also I9 MICH. L. Rr:v. III, commenting on Beisel v. Crosby 
(Neb., 1920), 178 N. W. 272. 
Rr:s !PSA loQUlTUR-RS.ATION TO BURDEN OF PROQF.-In an action for 
negligent burning of timber on the plaintiff's land there was some evidence 
that the fire originated from sparks emitted from one of the defendant's 
engines. The court recognized that the case was a proper one for the appli-
cation of the doctrine of res ispa loquitur, and in its instruction to the jury 
imposed upon the defendant the burden of satisfying the jury by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that it was not negligent. Held, instruction errone-
ous. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not change the burden of proof, 
but merely makes a prima facie case in favor of the plaintiff and pl;ices on 
the defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence. Page v. 
Camp Mfg. Co. (N. C .. I920), 104 S. E. 66/'. 
The court in the instant case correctly states what is now the prevailing 
view as to the relation between the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the 
burden of proof. The principle is applied where the circumstances of the 
occurrence are such as to warrant the inference of negligence and makes it 
incumbent upon the defendant to adduce evidence in rebuttal if he desires 
to do so. Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233; Kay v. M etropolita11 St. R)•. Co., 
163 N. Y. 447; Everett v. Foley, 132 Ill. App. 438. South Carolina supports 
the view that the burden of proof ii> thereby shifted. Sullivan v. Charleston. 
& W. C. R. Co., 85 S. C. 532. Instructions similar to those given in the 
instant case were upheld in Atlantic Coast Lille R. Co. v. Jones, 132 Ga. I8g. 
For many other cases approving similar instructions see note in L. R. A. 
I9I6A 930. Even in many cases which recognize the theoretical sound'ness 
of the rule that the burden of proof never shifts confusion has been intro-
duced into the law in deciding whether or not given instructions are in con-
formity to the rule. This has been due to a misapprehension of the correct 
meaning of the terms "burden of proof" and "preponderance of the evidence" 
or to a loose employment of these terms. Furnish v. Mo. P.R. Co., I02 Mo. 
438; Baum v. N. Y. Q. C. R. Co., I24 App. Div. I2; Abrams v. Seattle, 6o 
Wash. 356; Carroll v. Boston Elev. R. Co., 200 Mass. 527. Some of these 
courts have suggested that a loose or unscientific use of these terms will not 
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contuse the jury, and that therefore instructions to the effect that "the bur-
den ot proof has shifted to the defendant" or "the defendant must prove by 
.i preponderance of the evidence that he was not negligent" are not preju-
d1c1ally erroneous. But it would seem that if these terms have a well-defined 
legal meaning, their correct use should be insisted upon, even at the risk of 
reversal on what seem purely technical grounds. Such is the view of the 
United States Supreme Court in Sweeney v. Erving, supra, which is approved 
in the instant case. As to whether the presumption of negligence requires 
or merely permits a verdict for the plaintiff if the defendant produces no 
evidence in rebuttal, the decisions are not in harmony. See Sweet1ey v. Err1-
ing, s11pra, and Briglio v. Holt, 85 Wash. 155. See W1GMOR!>, par. 2509, for 
rules governing the application of the doctrine of res ipsa lcquitur. 
SI.ANDtR-"CRooK" NOT SI.ANDJ>Rous Pt& Ss.-It was alleged that defend-
ant said of plaintiff, "Madame is a crook," and that the words imputed com-
mission of crime involving moral turpitude or infamous punishment. Held, 
the innuendo is not supported by reason or authority; that "crook" is applied 
to persons who are not guilty of crime. and as no special damage is alleged 
the cause is dismissed on demurrer. Villemin v. Brown, 184 N. Y. S. 570. 
In the English courts and the majority of American courts it is the duty 
of the court to determine whether the language used in the publication can 
fairly or reasonably' be construed to have the meaning imputed, and if the 
court determines it is capable of such construction it is then left to the jury 
to decide in what sense the language was used. Hankinson v. Bilby, 16 M. 
& W. 441; Slmbley v. Ashton, 130 Ia. 195; Downs v. Hawley, nz Mass. 237; 
Langer v. Courier News, 179 N. W. 909- On the other hand, in some juris-
dictions, including that of the principal case, when the words are free from 
ambiguity or evidence tending to change their natural meaning, whether 
they are slanderous or libellous per se or not is passed upon by the court as 
a matter of law. Cooper v. Gt'eele-y, I Denio (N. Y.) 347 ~ More v. Betiett, 
48 N. Y. 472; Pugh v. McCarty, 44 Ga. 383; Gottbehuet v. Hubachek, 36 Wis. 
515; Gabe v. McGinnis, 68 Ind'. 538. Determined either as a matter of fact 
or of law, it would seem that "crook" means a person liable to imprisonment 
for crime. The court in the principal case apparently treats of "crook'' and 
"crooked" as synonymous. This may havi: been a source of error. While 
neither term is credited with a precise meaning, "crooked" commonly denotes 
failure to abide by the prevailing morality, whereas "crook" is a term carry-
ing greater opprobrium, and ordinarily suggests a person who gains a liveli-
hood by committing felonies. The class of slanders per se is a rigid one, 
but not without reason, and, as the principal case holds, whenever a plaintiff 
has suffered actual damage he is always at liberty to show it and recover 
for it. 
Stl!ltltt RAILRoADs-CON'.l'RIIlU'.rORY NllGI.lG1':NO: IN FAU.ING To SroP AND 
LooK A Qui,:sr10N OF FACT.-Plaintiff, while crossing defendant's street rail-· 
way track, was struck by a street car and severely injured. Plaintiff's auto-
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mobile was moving at a rate of two miles an hour and the street car \\"\5 
approaching at a speed of thirty miles an hour. Defendant moved for a 
peremptory instruction in its favor, contending that plaintiff's failure to 
stop and look before crossing constituted contributory negligence, as a mat-
ter of law, which barred his right to recover. The court refused so to 
instruct, and left the question of contributory negligence to the jury. Held, 
that failure to stop and look does not constitute contributory negligence as 
a matter of law, but is a question of fact for the jury. Washington Ry. & 
Electric Co. v. Stuart (D. C., 1920) 26i Fed. 632. 
The court, in this case, clearly draws the distinction between cases 
involving steam railway crossings and those involving street railway cross-
ings. The general rule in the case of steam railway crossings seems to be 
that failure to stop, look and listen before crossing constitutes contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. Koch v. Southern California R. R., 148 Cal. 
677, and cases there cited; Haven v. Erie R. R., 41 N. Y. 2!)6; Northern 
Pacific Ry. Ca; v. Freeman, 174 U. S. 379. In the principal case the court 
points· out that no one has a. right to assume that a steam train or interurban 
car, operated on the company's right of way, will be under control with a 
view of stopping promptly if the safety of a pedestrian or other person cross-
ing the track requires it. It also points out that street railway tracks are 
necessarily to be crossed with great frequency, by reason of their occupancy 
of public streets, and that the facility with which such cars are stopped and 
the frequency of their stopping make the danger measurably less than that 
incurred in crossing an ordinary railroad crossing. The weight of authority 
seems to support the distinctions here drawn. Detroit United Ry. v. Nichols, 
165 Fed. 289; City & Sub1trba1i R'!,•. Co. v. Cooper, 32 App. D. C. 550; 
M cQuistm v. Detroit Street Ry., 148 Mich. 67. 
TRIALS-MOTION FOR DIR£CTED V:ERDIC'l'-EFFECT OF MOTION BY BOTH 
Sm:ES.-P sued D as assignee of X. D set up as a special defense that the 
assignment was void because it was champertous. At the close of the testi-
many D moved for a directed verdict on the ground the evidence conclusively 
showed champerty, and P. also moved for a directed verdict, with the proviso 
that if the court ruled against them he be allowed to go to the jury upon the 
facts. The court refused to accept the conditional motion and ordered P 
to elect between going to the jury and moving for the directed verdict. 
Under protest P moved: for a directed verdict, and then the court found· as 
a fact that the assignment was champertous and rendered judgment for D. 
Held, error, for where counsel makes it plain that he wishes to go to the 
jury on a question of fact, a motion for a directed verdict by both sides does 
not present the question of fact irrevocably to the court. Sampliner v. Motion 
Pictllre Patents Co. (U. S., 1920). 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 79. 
While it is true, as the trial court held, that a request by both sides for 
directed verdict, by the great weight of authority, waives the right to trial 
of the facts by the jury and submits them to the court, yet it does not follow 
that the implication of waiver may not be rebutted by an express or implied 
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denial of an intention to waive. Hatch v. Calhoun County, 170 Mich. 322; 
St. Louis Railway v Mulkey, 100 Ark. 71, Ann. Cas. l913C I338. and note. 
The trial court seems to have fallen into the same error which has deterred 
minority courts from following the general rule on the ground that its adop-
tion would provide a trap for the unwary and a penalty of a denial of trial 
by jury upon a motion for directed verdict. Wolf v. Chicago Sign Co., 233 
Ill. 501, 13 Ann. Cas. 36g, and note; Virginia-Tennessee Hardware Co. v. 
Hodges, 126 Tenn. 370. One court at least has reached the minority rule as 
a matter of logic and analysis of the effect of a motion for directed verdict, 
saying that "one who claims that the evidence is all his way cannot reason-
ably be held to waive the right to claim that, at least, some of it is his way." 
Fitzsimmons v. Richardsoti, 86 Vt. 229. That the minority courts have no 
reason to refuse to follow the majority rule because of its danger is not only 
shown conclusively by the decision of the court. in the principal case but 
also by an unbroken line of decisions in courts following the majority rule. 
Empire State Cattle Co. v. Atchison Ry., 2IO U. S. I, also note in 6 Ann, 
Cas. 547; Pemistoti v. Coleman, 126 N. Y. S. 736. The power of counsel to 
request a jury trial even after both parties have moved for directed verdicts 
apparently should conclusively answer the objection.s to the general rule 
given voice to in the Wolf and Hodges cases, supra. 
VENDOR AND PURCHAS£R-AGRttl1UlNT TO CONVEY Fro:E FROM ENCUM-
BRANC£S AS APPI.1£» TO VISIBLE EASEMENTS.-Suit was brought by an execu-
tor to enforce specifically an agreement for the sale of land free from all 
encumbrances. W defended on the ground that the plaintiff could not give 
him a marketable title, since the land was subject to an easement of way 
for electric wires carried upon huge steel towers. J!eld, no defense, for 
vendee is presumed to have contracted to accept the land subject to encum-
brances of an open and notorious nature. McCart~· v. Wilson (Cal., 1920), 
193 Pac. 578. 
The decision of the principal case rested largely upon another recent 
California decision, Ferguson v. Edgar ( 1919), 178 Cal. 17, where it was held 
that a vendee had no right to rescind a contract to purchase land free from 
encumbrances, because of the existence of an irrigation ditch and canal upon 
the land. This principal has been generally applied in cases involving a public 
highway, Patterson v. Arthurs, 9 Watts (Pa.) 152, and especially in suits 
upon covenants against encumbrances by the grantee of a warranty deed. 
MAUPIN ON MARKETABLE TITL"lt, 304; Kellog v. Ingersoll, 2 Mass. 97, co11tra,-
and in one case at least it was held not an encumbrance within the meaning 
of the covenant. even though the purchaser did not know of the existence 
of the highway. Sandum v. Johnson, 122 Minn. 368, but this case is extreme. 
As to ordinary private easements, the authorities are irreconcilably in con-
flict. The theory of one group of these cases seems to be that the mstru-
ment being the grantor's, and having failed to put in an exception, he must 
abide by his covenant as made, and knowledge by the grantee cannot have 
the effect of qualifying a general covenant, since an article may be warranted 
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to be sound when both parties know it to be unsound (Hubbard v. No1·ton, 
10 Conn. 423; Beach v. Miller, SI Ill. 200) ; but the general rule is that a 
general warranty does not cover defects which the buyer must have observed. 
WILLISTON ON SALES, 207. In Haldane v. Sweet, SS Mich. 1g6, Cooley, J., 
laid down the rule that the existence of an alley which is visible is no e...._cuse 
for failing to perform a contract to purchase land, in accordance with the 
reasoning of the principal case. Kutz v. McCune, 22 Wis. 628; Smith v. 
Hughes, so Wis. 620, accord. It is submitted that although the rule of the 
principal case seems to be more calculated to do justice where urged as a 
merely technical defense to a contract lawfully entered into, the opposite 
rule is more logical, and not so dangerous to apply. See 30 L. R. A. N. S. 
833 and 48 L. R. A. N. S. for a compilation of the authorities. 
WILLS-TRUST NOT CREATED BY DIRECTION TO DISPOSE OF PROPER'!\" "Ac-
CORDING To Br:sT ]UDGMENT.''-A will directed the executor and another named 
person "to divide and distribute the residue according to their best judg-
ment." In a bill for a construction of the will, held, there was no trust, 
express or implied, but an unqualified power of appointment which the court 
could not control. Harvey v. Griggs (Del., r920), 111 Atl. 437. 
There are two possibilities in such a case. First, the language may be 
interpreted as an absolute power of disposition, uncontrollable by the court. 
Second, it may be regarded as creating a trust which is void for indefinite-
ness, and there will be a resulting trust for the heirs or next of kin. In the 
following cases no trust was implied: "to be at the disposal of his wife in 
and by her last will and testament to whom she shall think fit and proper 
to give the same," Robinson v. D1mgate, 2 Vern. r81; "to be disposed of unto 
such person or persons * * * as they in their discretion shall think proper 
and expedience," Gibbs v. Rumsey, 2 V. & B. 294; to executors to dispose of 
"as they in their di;cretion shall think fit,'' Paice v. Archbishop of Canter-
bury, r4 Ves. Jr. 364; to be disposed of "as the trustee hereof for the time 
being in the uncontrolled absolute discretion or pleasure of such trustee 
shall see fit,'' Norman v. Prince, 40. R. I. 402. In the following cases a result-
ing trust for the heir& or next of kin was imposed: "Upon trust to * * * 
dispose of the ultimate residue to such objects of benevolence and liberally 
as the bishop * * * in his own discretion shall most approve oi,'' Morice v. 
Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. Jr. 6s6; "in trust to expend solely for benevolent 
purposes in their discretion;• Willets v. Willets, 103 N. Y. '5so; "in trust to 
be distributed and disposed of a's he pleases," Haskell v. Staples, 116 Me. 
103; "to such charitable, educational and scientific purposes as in your judg-
ment will most substantially benefit mankind," Tilden v . . Green, 103 N. Y. 
29. For many other cases see AMES, CASES ONT.RUSTS f20d Ed.], p. 93, note; 
37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 400. Having determined in the instant case that the 
e."<ecutor took an arbitrary power of disposition, the case is simple of solu-
tion. If he is willing to carry out the obvious intention of the testator, the 
court cannot prevent him. Norman v. Prince. sllpra. But if it is clear that 
the executor is not to take brneficially (courts have seized upon the words 
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"in trust'' or "to trustees" as controlling, though in Norman v. Prince, supra, 
it is denied that they are significant), and that the trust is not charitable, the 
fa1.1: that there is no beneficiary who can enforce the trust has caused most 
courts to allow it to fail. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, supra. Where, how-
ever, the trustee is willing to act in such cases, there would seem to be no 
reason for refusing to permit him to effectuate the intention of the testator. 
Re Gibbon [1917], I I. R 448. For arguments on both sides of this question 
see 5 HARV. L. R.l;v. 389 and 15 HARv. L. Ri>v. 509. 
WORKMEN'S COMPSNSATION-ACCID!tNT ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMSNT-
SPORnVr: ACT oF Co-tMPLOYJ>£.-Where an employee while devoting his time 
to his work was struck in the eye by an apple thrown by a fellow servant 
engaged in horseplay, it was held that the injury was one "arising out of and 
in the course of his employment,'' within the Workmen's Compensation Law. 
Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills (N. Y., 1920), 128 N. E. 711. 
The general rule under the English Workmen's Compensation Act is 
that an employee who is injured while "larking" or while in the performance 
of some sportive act cannot recover, for the reason that the injuries are not 
regarded as arising out of the employment. Fitzgerald v. Clarke & Son 
[1!)08], 2 K. B. 796; Wilso1~ v. Laing [1909], Court of Session, 1230; Wrigl.?y 
v. Nasmyth, Wilson & Co. [1913], 'NV. C. & Ins. Rep. 145. To the same 
effect are most of the American decisio~s. Thompson v. Emplo3•ers' Liability 
Assur. Corp., Ltd., 2 Mass. W. C. C. 145; Matter of Stillwagon v. Callan 
Bros., 224 N. Y. 71•4; In re Zelavzmi, 1 Ohio Ind. Comm. Bull. (No. 7) 87, 
(No. 48427, 1914), 8 N. C. C. A. 286; Payne v. Industrial Comn. (Ill., 1920), 
129 N'. E. 122. The reason for refusing the award is that the claimant has, 
by himself engaging in the horseplay, suspended his work and temporarily 
stepped outside his employment. The New Jersey court has gone even 
farther by declaring that the employer is not liable for an injury due to 
horseplay "whether the injured party instigated the occurrence or took 
no part in it; for, while an accident happening in such circumstances may 
arise in the course of, it cannot be said to arise out of, the employment." 
Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N. J. L. 161. To the same effect, see also the 
two Michigan cases of In re Boelema. and Ratkowski v. Am. Car. & Foundry 
Co., 5 N. C. C. A. 7<}3. The principal case, in drawing the line between 
those cases in which the claimant did and those in which he did not take 
part in the sportive acts which resulted in the injury, has the support of a 
number of decisions, both American and English. Knopp v. Am. Car & 
Foundry Co., 186 Ill. App. 6o5; Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 
Ill. 53;. In re Mack, I Ohio Ind. Comm. Bull. (No. 7) 120 (No. 37914, 1914); 
Shaw v. Macfarlane, 52 Sc. L. R 236. The extension of the operation of 
the Workmen's Compensation Acts to the latter class of cases may, perhaps, 
be justified upon the ground that these statutes are remedial and should be 
broadly interpreted. Moore v. Lehigh Valley R31• Co., 154 N. Y. S. 620. But, 
even so, the reasoning in the principal case to the effect that the injury arises 
out of the business because skylarking among the employees is "something 
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reasonably to be expected" proves rather too much. Fo11owed to its logical 
conclusion, this argument would destroy the very distinction sought to be 
established, and would lead to a11owing the claim even in a case where the 
injured employee was himself taking part in the sportive acts which resulted 
in his injury. For a note on the general subject of accidents "arising out 
of" employment, see 16 MxcH. L. REv. 179· 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Act-COMPENSATION FOR INJURY AGGRAVAT-
ING A LATENT D1sSAS1>.-P, an apparently able-bodied young man, in starting 
a gas engine caught his foot, which was lacerated, and fell in a faint. He 
lost the use of hisi legs. Medical testimony showed he was suffering from 
multiple sclerosis, hardening of the brain. Also that this disease was hered-
itary or caused by acute infection; that any shock or excitement would aggra-
vate the disease and bring on the present condition of disability. In an action 
for compensation, held, the injury precipitated the present condition of P 
and is fully responsible therefor. P is entitled to compensation for total 
incapacity for life. Blackburn v. Coffeyville Vitrified Brick and Tile Co, 
(Kan., 1920), 193 Pac. 351. 
The Compensation Acts, genera11y speaking, impose a liability on the 
employer for any accidental injuries to his employees arising out of the 
employment. HONNOLD, WoRKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 4- The question arises 
as to what constitutes an accidental or personal injury within the meaning 
of the acts. Often the incapacity from which the employee suffers or which 
causes his death is the immediate result of a disease. Then the problem is 
to determine whether the disease is to be considered as the proximate result 
of an accident so as to make the Compensation Act applicable. In cases like 
the principal case, where the disease from which the employee was suffering 
or died was aggravated or accelerated by the accident, compensation is 
awarded on the theory that the accident was the proximate cause of the 
disability or death. Thus where an employee accidentally fe11, and testimony 
showed that the injury aroused latent tuberculosis, accelerated the disease 
and caused death earlier than otherwise, <:ompensation was given for death. 
Retmier v. Cmse (Ind.), n9 N. E. 32; Van Keuren v. Dwight Divine & 
Sons, 165 N. Y. Supp. 1049; see cases cited in 15 N. C. C. A. 632 and 17 N. 
C. C. A. 864- The accident aggravating the disease may be undue excite-
ment or strain in the course of employment. Thus, where a night watchman 
died after the excitement of a fire in the plant, it was found he had a weak 
heart. The court, in reversing the decision of the Accident Board denying 
compensation. said: "The fact that the man's condition predisposed him to 
such an accident or stroke must be, under the authorities, held to be imma-
terial. White the exertion and excitement which accelerated the heart action 
were not the sole proximate cause of the death, they were certainly concur-
ring causes. Schroetke v. Jackson-Church Co., 193 Mich. 616. So also, 
where a miner who was pushing a coal car up a grade suddenly complained 
of his side and died shortly, the evidence showing that his heart was diseased 
and that the strain caused a rupture of the heart resulting in death, the court 
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awarded compensation on the ground that the personal injury, the rupture 
nf the heart. was by accident, as it hastened to a fatal end an ailment. 
Indian Creek Coal Co. v. Calvert (Ind.), n9 N. E. 5I9. Death or incapacity 
resulting from a non-occupational disease alone is not compensable. A 
workman dying of apoplexy was denied compensation where there was neither 
unusual happening nor accident. Guthrie v. Detroit Ship Co., 200 Mich. 355. 
It appears that there must actually be an accident in order for an injury 
aggravating a disease to be compensable. The compensation recoverable is 
usually held to be for the total disability, not merely for that degree of the 
disability which was caused by the accident as distinguished from that which 
was caused by the disease. Indianapolis Abattoir Co. v. Colemaii (Ind.), 
II7 N. E. 502. "The previous condition of health of the employee is of no 
consequence in determining the amount of relief to be afforded * "" * [But] 
it is only where there is a direct causal connection between the exertion of 
the employment and the injury that an award of comp~sation can be made." 
In re Madden, 222 Mass. 487, the court pointing out that where the disease 
was the cause of the injury no award can be made, but where the employ-
ment was a proximate contributing cause to the injury there ought to be an 
award made. The decision in the principal case appears to be in accord 
with the authorities and the correct view. The theory of the Compensation 
Acts is that every personal loss to an employee, as such, is an element of 
the cost of production and should be 'charged to the industry. It is to pro-
tect the employee at the expense of the industry. Being social in its aim 
and conception, and making no distinction in the condition of the health of 
employees, the Act should compensate for the disability, even though the 
injury is aggravated by or aggravates a congenital weakness or a preexisting 
disease. 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT--INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN CoURSE 
OF EHPtoYMENT.-Leaving the works where she was employed during the 
dinner hour, a machinist ·went to a canteen provided by her employers in 
another part of the premises. Hurrying down a flight of stairs leading from 
the canteen to the street which connected the canteen and the works, she 
slipped and broke her ankle. Held (two of the five judges dissenting), the 
injury arose out of and in the course of the employment, within the meaning 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co. v. 
Redford [1920], A. C. 757. 
A workman's employment is not confined to the actual work upon which 
he is engaged, but extends to those actions which by the terms of his employ-
ment he is entitled to take or where by such terms he is taking his me;ils 
on the employer's premises. Brice v. Lloyd [1909), 2 K. B, 8o4; Friebel v. 
Chicago City Ry. Co., 28o Ill. 76, II7 N. E. 467; Scott v. Payne Bros., 85 N. 
J. L. 446, 8g Atl. 927. The period of employment is not necessarily broken 
by mere intervals of leisure such as those taken for meals. In re Sundfae, 
218 Mass. 1, 105 N. E. 433; HoNNor.n, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Sec. in. 
As the court said in the instant case, "the taking of meats is a matter ancil-
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lary and incidental to the employment." Up to this point there is little con-
flict of opinion. Where the courts divide is as to what acts of the dining 
employee are "within the contemplation of both parties to the contract as 
necessarily incidental to it." Plainly, where the worker is in a forbidden 
place or doing an obviously dangerous act during the lunch hour there can 
be no recovery for any injuries he may receive. Brice v. Llosd, supra; 
Manor v. Pennington, 180 App. Dh 130, 167 N. Y. Supp. 424; Weis Paper 
Mill Co. v. Industrial Commission (Ill., 1920), 127 N. E. 732. Similarly, if 
during the leisure hour a workman absented himself from the place of 
employment for his own purposes there would be such an interruption of 
the employment as to defeat a recovery of compensation for an injury during 
such absence. Davidson v. M'Robb [1918], A. C. 304. On the one hand, 
where the employee eats his lunch in the factory according to an established 
custom and he is there injured, the mishap is said to be incidental to his 
employment and a recovery is allowed. Racine Rubber Co. v. Industrial 
Commissum, 165 Wis. 6oo, 162 N. W. 664. On the other hand, where the 
accident occurs in a public street the courts are inclined to refuse a recovery, 
unless it can be shown that the employee was in the street on the busines-, 
of, or as a duty that he owed to, his employer. Bell v. Armstrong, 88 L. J. 
K. B. 844. See in this connection 16 :l\11cH. L. Rr:v. 179. Between these two 
extremes come injuries, such as that in the principal case, which occur 011 
the employer's premises. In fo re S1111dine, supra, such an accident was held 
to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, although the.stairs 
on which the employee slipped and was hurt were not under the employer's 
control. The court said it was sufficient that they were on his premises. In 
Highley v. Lancashire & Y. Rj•. Co., 85 L. J. K. ·B. 1513, a worker recovered 
although the accident occurred on train tracks which workers used as a 
"short cut" to the mess room, against the railway company's orders. In the 
instant case the arbitrator found that the stairs were part of the premises 
where the injured employee was employed, and where she would have no 
right to be except by virtue of her employment. In this fact the majority of 
the court found the element of causal relationship between the employment 
and the accident necessary to allow a recovery under the A.ct. The rule 
announced in the principal case seems to be in harmony with the trend of 
modern authority on the point involved See BoYD. WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION, Sec. 481; L. R. A. 191? A. 320; 6 A. L. R. n51 • See also 19 MICH. L. 
Rev. 232. 
